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Dedication 
This report is dedicated to five people. 
•  Sir Robert Torrens and Ulrich Hubbe; and 
•  Lord Sherbrook, Robert Lowe and Lord Bramwell. 
The first two of these people developed the Torrens Title Property 
Title registration system that dramatically simplified and improved 
dealings in land around the world.  It was based on a system used 
in the nineteenth century to register ships in Germany.  The 
Torrens Title Act was passed by the South Australian Parliament in 
1857. 
The second three of these people developed the idea of a limited 
liability share company.  The Companies Act was passed by the 
British Parliament in 1862.  The practical bottom line solution was 
simple – add “Limited” to the end of a Company name. 
Both ideas established new legal concepts and precedents. Both 
radically changed the grounds for dispute and dramatically reduced 
transaction costs.  Both are built upon foundation concepts that 
have stood the test of time. 
This report begins the search for a new non-controversial way to 
define and trade interests in water and other natural resources.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report is about the search for an economically efficient and 
equitable system of defining, allocating, and managing use of 
natural resources that proves to be robust.  Robust in the sense 
that the fundamental principles and foundations upon which it is 
based remains unchanged over time. 
We focus on the notion of “interests” in natural resources, and 
obligations associated with use. 
We search for a generic robust approach to the definition of 
interests, rights and use obligations that sits comfortably within an 
economically efficient trading system.  Pricing and charging issues 
and the question of how to convert from existing systems to the 
proposed one are left for subsequent reports. 
Comments and engagement in discussions with us is invited. 
1.1 COAG   
Two key elements of the COAG reform process are: first, a 
commitment to separate interests in land from interests in water; 
and second, to improve pricing arrangements.  We leave water-
pricing considerations, including the effects of inconsistent pricing 
arrangements on trade, to other reports. Nevertheless, it needs to 
be recognised that inconsistent pricing arrangements, inconsistent 
use conditions and inconsistent approaches to enforcement distort 
trade and discourage economically efficient resource use.
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While the separation of interests in water from interests in land 
has facilitated the emergence of new markets for water resources, 
a major debate has been generated about water allocation, river 
flows, water trading, the environment and compensation.  We note 
also that the existing plethora of water allocation systems have 
been derived piecemeal over time and have not been built for 
trading – in effect, trading has been “bolted on”. 
As a general rule separation enables resources to be used in a more 
economically efficient manner.  The separation of water from land 
is the first step and to varying degrees is being achieved.  We 
pursue the second step – specification of interests in water into a 
system that should prove robust and stand the test of time. 
                                             
1   See, for example, Brennan & Scoccimaro (1999); DNRE (2001); 
Eigenraam and Stoneham 91998); NCC(2002); Shadwick (2002); Young et 
al. (2000) and Young & Hatton MacDonald (2001).  
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1.2  A robust system 
A robust system would need to facilitate: 
•  Resolution of resource allocation between consumptive use 
and the environment, among consumptive users, and of 
issues related to distribution and use; 
•  Secure, economically efficient and low cost trading and 
administration; 
•  Assignment of risks making it clear where responsibility lies, 
under what circumstances compensation is due, and specifying 
the processes for obtaining redress; 
•  Management of externalities associated with use  - the 
interests of third parties, future generations and the 
environment – with minimum controversy. 
A robust system also must pass the conventional tests of efficiency 
and fairness in a changing world.  For this to occur, the system 
must be built on a solid conceptual foundation. 
In the search for insights as to how to do build a robust system, we 
have cast our net wide. 
1.3 The  search 
•  From the limited liability share company structure we have 
– interests expressed in proportional terms (shares), the use 
of accounting systems to determine how much “profit” is 
available for use by others and, also, the notion of 
managing dividends separately from shares. 
•  From the Torrens Title system comes - guaranteed 
recording of all interests on a register, formal settlement 
procedures, and irreversibility of market transactions. 
•  From the banking and finance system we get - internet 
debit and credit accounting systems, exchange rates and 
associated formal transaction mechanisms. 
•  From other sources, we identify - the definition of risks and 
responsibilities, and the definition of conditions and 
obligations to third parties. 
Over time, robust systems are characterised by the use of separate 
instruments for each distinguishable component.  
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1.4 Separation 
From this search, we observe that separation of the interests into 
their component parts facilitates the development of more 
economically efficient management and accounting systems.  This 
provides for adjustment of part of the system without having to 
deal with the whole system, and reduces transaction costs. 
Risk management is more economically efficient when each type of 
risk is defined and assigned separately. 
1.5  Definitions of the interest 
For each dimension of a tradeable resource allocation system that 
needs to be managed, we propose separation.  Essentially, an 
interest in any common pool resource, like a quantity of water, can 
be considered as having three key components: 
•  The entitlement – the long-term interest (share) in a 
varying stream of periodic allocations; 
•  Allocations – a unit of opportunity (usually a volume) as 
distributed periodically; and 
•  The use licence – permission to use allocations with pre-
specified use conditions and obligations to third parties. 
In a separated system, each component can be managed 
independently without consideration of what is happening to the 
other component.  Entitlements define equity among those with 
interests in the resource, allocations define the periodic quantity 
that may be extracted from the common pool or sold, and the use 
licence defines the site-specific conditions pertaining to use 
including limits on the degree to which users, by choice of 
practice, are allowed to change the environment. 
In areas or systems where use may cause adverse impacts like 
salinity, the use licence should be expressed in a manner that 
enables a separate entitlement/allocation system to be set up to 
manage that issue.  Similarly, the entitlement should be drafted in 
a manner that enables channel congestion to be devolved to a 
separate entitlement/allocation system. 
The system we summarise applies, with minor variation, to all 
water resource systems – regulated and unregulated, surface and 
ground.  Although not explained in this report, we suspect that it is 
applicable to many other common pool resources.  
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1.6 The  entitlement 
The most valuable component is the entitlement – the long-term 
interest in a stream of allocations that occur from time to time. 
Entitlements are granted by government.  They define the degree 
of access to the resource that can be expected over time and the 
nature of changes, if any, that can be expected. 
In defining the entitlement, five considerations are important: 
•  What priority, if any, is given to entitlement holders when 
the available resource is distributed and how reliable or 
variable access is likely to be; 
•  The nature of the periodic allocations to be expected; 
•  The extent of the area and resource over which risks 
associated with the entitlement are pooled; 
•  How allocative risks are distributed between entitlement 
holders and the government; and 
•  The effects of land use changes on future allocations. 
Essentially, if both priority and risk are managed at the 
entitlement level, then trading of allocations can be relatively 
unconstrained and exposed to market forces.  Provided, of course, 
that externalities resulting from the use of the resource are 
managed via a separate use licence. 
Attention needs to be given to the size of the common pool.  
Within the pool there is little opportunity for arbitrage.  
Entitlement conversion from one part of the system to another 
requires an exchange rate to be set. At every exchange point 
opportunity for arbitrage is created. In short, the greater the 
extent of spatial coverage, the less the opportunity for exchange 
rate speculation and market manipulation by those who have 
access to privileged information. 
Priority and Reliability 
Classically, States have developed high and general security 
systems.  The entitlement embodied in each licence is defined by 
reference to a volume and statement about the probability that 
that volume will be delivered.  Implicit in the licence is an un-
stated assumption that all people who hold the same type of 
licence will receive identical opportunities per unit of volume.  
Whenever there is more than one entitlement class, typically 
allocations are made in order of priority or preference.  
Consequently, we conclude that the entitlement should be 
formally described as a share.  
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Priority relates to the reliability of the allocation stream over 
time.  Often discussions focus on the number of years in a hundred 
that periodic allocations will exceed the specified quantity.  Using 
the share approach, this would be handled by issuing different 
classes of entitlement shares.  If only one class of share is issued, 
then the level of individual risk can be managed through 
investment or trading. 
Allocations 
An allocation is a unit of opportunity that is known to exist in the 
common pool.  Consistent with trading rules and charges, the unit 
may be traded. It may also be used but only in a way consistent 
with the conditions and third party obligations on a use licence.  
When used or at the end of the period, the unit of allocation is 
extinguished. 
Under some systems, a considerable proportion of an unused 
allocation can be carried forward.  In other systems, storage 
without substantial loss is impossible.  Careful consideration of the 
incentives associated with the carry forward versus partial or total 
extinguishment issue is necessary. 
At the start of each period, once the quantity per entitlement to 
be allocated has been determined, whether derived from high or 
general security entitlements, trading can take place by volume 
alone.   
Allocations should be managed like bank accounts with debits, 
credits and balances.  By separating trading issues from use issues, 
trading costs can be kept low. 
Allocation trades are permanent in the sense that, once 
completed, they can not be undone.  Multiple trades, including 
trade back to the original source, are possible. 
Return flows 
Although periodic allocations vary over time, an important 
question is that of whether the interest to be traded is expressed 
in “gross” (volume pumped) or “net” (volume consumed).  The 
difference between gross and net reflects the effects that water-
use efficiency has on the volume of water returned to the system 
for use by others.  This issue is controversial in Australia but well 
accepted in the United States. If a person pumps 1,000 ML at 50% 
water use efficiency, 500 ML returns back to the system for use by 
others.  If the pathway is through groundwater the effect can be 
delayed.  Ultimately, if this 1,000 ML is sold to a highly efficient 
system (say 90%), an extra 400 ML is removed from the system.  
One irrigator gains at the expense of all others. 
Two approaches are possible, either the sum of gross entitlements 
should never be allowed to exceed the cap or, alternatively, only  
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that which has been consumed may be traded.  Real gains from 
trade occur only when there is improvement in net use. If trading 
in gross entitlements is allowed, in a fully allocated system where 
technical water use efficiency is low, the system will inevitably 
become over allocated as irrigators improve efficiency.  This 
situation can be addressed by across-the board proportional 
reductions in periodic allocations per share or defining and 
managing the interest and allocations as  “net”.  On the other 
hand, there are systems where “gross” is close to “net”, with little 
or no return flow. 
When cost or technology limitations, prevent direct measurement 
of net use either an attempt should be made to deem the extent of 
net use or entitlements should specifically make it clear that as 
net use increases gross allocations will be cut on a one for one 
basis. 
A reduction in return flows can also cause an increase in river 
salinity (dilution effect).  As indicated earlier, for a robust solution 
to the allocation problem, it is necessary also to manage salinity 
and other water quality issues separately from the management of 
volume.  
Assigning Risk 
If fully specified, the risk of change in entitlements and allocations 
needs to be partitioned between the holders and the government. 
Summarised below in tabular format is a framework for risk 
assignment.  The table suggests a way to partition risks into those 
met by entitlement holders, those where compensation claims can 
be made, and those unspecified. Compensation would be payable 
only when risk turns to reality and only in circumstances that 
might, in retrospect, be reasonably described as failure by the 
administrative agency to exercise adequate duty of care or 
diligence in managing the interests of all parties.  Compensation or 
structural assistance could be payable also in cases when there is a 
sudden and dramatic change in policy direction.  We recognise, 
however, that opinions vary on the need and case for 
compensation.  Our point is that, for efficient outcomes, it is 
necessary to specify the position taken in a transparent manner.  
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    Assignment of Risk 
Financial risk of change met entirely by 
entitlement  holder 
(Adaptive Risk) 
Compensation claim may be 
made against administering 
agency  
(Duty of care in managing the 
interests of all parties ) 
Financial risk 
incompletely specified 
or shared  
(Uncertainty) 
Natural variations in periodic allocations  (eg. 
seasonal fluctuations) 
Change in mean annual rainfall (eg. effect of 
climate change) 
Revised estimate of the capacity of the resource 
that are the result of an adaptive process 
(eg. improved scientific knowledge – adaptive 
management, proper process, relatively small 
changes over time) 
Land-use change
a) 
 (eg . pastures replaced by forestry) 
 
Administrative error associated 
with a transaction. An adjustment 
judged by the courts to be 
capricious. 
Issuance of new entitlements once 
the system is known to be fully 
allocated. 
Rapid and unexpected 
administrative change resulting in 
a sudden and significant reduction 
in the value of share 
entitlements
b).    
 
Catastrophes such as the 
failure of a dam. 
 
a) For significant land-use changes, it is possible to require that any negative impacts of land-use change be offset via 
the purchase and surrender of an entitlement equivalent to the size of the expected impact.  Similarly, it is possible to 
allow issuance of entitlement shares when land-use change results in a positive contribution. 
b) For example, resulting from initial over-commitment and failure to allocate in a precautionary manner. 
1.7  Registration and trading 
The Torrens Title experience clearly shows that by defining legal 
ownership through a register and guaranteeing its integrity, the 
risks of fraud and the cost of negotiating a trade are considerably 
lower.  Registration of third-party interests (mortgages) lowers the 
cost of credit significantly.  Licensing of brokers and development 
of formal settlement procedures lowers transaction costs. 
Clear trading rules including exchange rates should be established.  
Once executed, a trade is complete.   
There should be separate registers for entitlements and accounts 
for allocations. 
State of the art accounting systems can be used to record 
transactions.  Electronic trading should be possible for allocations. 
1.8 The  use  licence 
The holding of entitlements (shares) or even the holding of a 
distributed allocation of themselves provides no permission to use 
the resource.  While either of these components are fully  
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tradeable, to use an allocated resource, a third component is 
required.  This we have labelled earlier – the use licence. 
Typically, a use licence would state conditions of use and 
obligations to third parties.  The total volume of water that may be 
applied would be stated as an upper limit.  For example, a licence 
may authorise flood irrigation over say, 350 hectares at a specific 
location. 
Conditions of use 
These arise with specific use of an allocation and should reflect the 
requirements of a statutory management plan.  They may include 
pumping limits and drainage disposal requirements, possibly 
certain restrictions on practice, and reporting requirements. 
Third-party obligations 
Third-party impacts arise from resource use not the action of 
holding an entitlement or allocation.  The bottom-line statement 
of obligations should indicate the maximum degree of impact on 
others that is allowable.  For example, it may reserve the right to 
pollute to the state and indicate that the user may be obliged to 
rectify damages imposed on others and or the environment.   
Management planning processes could be used to signal when and 
to what extent obligations may be allowed to accumulate.  To this 
end, management plans need to be statutory instruments that have 
standing in law.  Third party obligations would also be consistent 
with any district or regional salinity management strategy, and 
may possibly be met wholly or partly through the use of market 
based instruments (eg. salinity credits). 
1.9 Legislation   
A related issue is the need for legislation to implement a separated 
right system.  Legislation facilitates and encourages consistency in 
approach.  In some states, existing arrangements and reforms 
underway mean that few amendments would be necessary to move 
to the proposed system.  In other States significant changes are 
necessary. 
1.10 Implementation issues 
There are a number of important implementation issues that 
require addressing.  The most topical of these is the issue of how 
to define the environment’s interest so that its effect on the 
interests of consumptive users is fully understood and accepted.    
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The environment’s interest can be defined as being either 
•  prior to those of consumptive users; or 
•  equivalent and, hence, defined so that trade between 
environment and consumptive use is possible. 
Under the “prior” model, all risk of change in the expected stream 
of allocations due to alteration in community environmental values 
is born by entitlement holders.  Under the “equivalent” model, risk 
is shifted to society and change, if not executed via a market 
transaction, would be compensable.  Entitlement values will be 
higher under the equivalent model than under the prior model.  
Careful, examination of these two alternative models and variants 
of them is necessary.  If the environment’s interest is managed 
under the “equivalent” model, very careful consideration has to be 
given to the way periodic allocations would be managed and 
accounted for.  Conceptually, it is possible to make a base 
allocation to the environment under prior rules and then manage 
the residual under the equivalent model. 
Other critical implementation issues to be explored include centre 
around questions about  
Definition, Planning and Management and, in particular: 
•  Identifying the most appropriate spatial extent of each 
entitlement – a Basin, a catchment, a valley or a reach – 
with close consideration of the arbitrage and risk-sharing 
opportunities different arrangements set up; 
•  Determining the pros and cons of having a single 
entitlement versus one where there are two, three or more 
classes of shares; 
•  Determining how the separated system can be linked 
seamlessly to licences for overland flows, farm dams and 
unregulated streams; 
•  Determining the most appropriate planning and 
management structure. 
Trading and dealing and, in particular:  
•  Determining what charging and pricing arrangements should 
apply; 
•  Establishing a bank-like trading system for allocations; 
•  Determining the extent to which inter-dependent 
entitlements can be exchanged for one another – surface 
water for groundwater; 
•  Determining how to manage simply the return flow or 
“gross” versus “net” issue;  
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•  Determining the nature of periodic allocations, time until 
extinguishment and ways to define return flows; 
•  Determining whether or not allocations should be managed 
at the same or a different scale to entitlements. 
Use licence specification and, in particular: 
•  Determining how to specify third-party obligations and 
organising them so that they can be separated from the use 
licence and, issues like salinity and channel flow capacity, 
managed in an independent trading environment. 
•  Determining what needs to be included in a use licence and 
what is best left in a management plan and how the two 
should interact; 
•  Determining how use licence conditions can be reviewed 
and the best processes used to change them. 
Conversion 
•  Determining what principles and processes should be used 
in the conversion to a separated system; 
•  Determining how to convert the licences in any specific 
area to the new separated system.  
1.11 Concluding comment 
While some may disagree, we consider all the above, including the 
question of how to define and manage environmental flows as 
second order issues that need to be considered after a robust 
foundation is in place.  Consequently, we perceive that the next 
steps involve careful exploration and consideration of the 
separated system proposed in this report followed by a series of 
reports on each of the issues listed above:  Options for definition of 
the environment’s interest; integrated planning and management 
of the resource; trading and registration arrangements; use licence 
specification; and conversion principles and processes. 
Finally, as stated at the start of this report, we seek a robust way 
to define interests in water and other natural resources.  To this 
end, we seek comments and feedback.  Comments should be sent 
to Mike.Young@csiro.au or Jim.McColl@csiro.au.  We can be 
contacted by phone on 08-8303.8665.  
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ROBUST SEPARATION:  A SEARCH FOR A GENERIC 
FRAMEWORK TO SIMPLIFY REGISTRATION AND 
TRADING OF INTERESTS IN NATURAL RESOURCES 
‘Don’t slavishly follow precedent.  New precedents are 
waiting to be born.”   
Sir William Payne, 1959. 
1 Introduction 
This report is about the search for an economically efficient and 
equitable definition and trading of property rights.  We focus on 
the notion of “interests” in natural resources and “obligations” 
associated with the use of natural resources. 
Because the same words have different meanings in different 
states
2 and that we suspect that we are looking for new legal 
concepts, we intentionally avoid using terms in common parlance. 
Although our search is for a generic system applicable to all natural 
resources,
3 we focus on water resources.  We consider that the 
most appropriate way to define interests in water and obligations 
associated with the use of water is still controversial.  The prime 
reason for this is that the existing plethora of water allocation 
systems have been derived piece-meal over time and have not 
been built for trading – in effect, trading has been “bolted on”.  
Also, most systems were established in a development era when 
the aim was to get the resource used.  As a result, it is often not 
clear that the total quantity of the resource available is limited.  
Every time one person takes more, some-one else gets less.  
The plethora of systems complicates trading, management and 
communication.  Opening up opportunities for arbitrage and 
confusion, exchange rates are used to convert from one system to 
another; and salinity obligations associated with a licence vary 
from State to State.  Expectations about the amount of water that 
is likely to accrue to a licence also vary.  In Victoria, for example, 
a high security licence holder can expect to receive access to sales 
water while in NSW there is no such expectation.  The ongoing 
right is called an entitlement in New South Wales but a licensed 
allocation in South Australia.
4  The period for which a licence is 
                                             
2   See Carmicheal, A. and Cummins, T. (No date) 
3   Strictly, all common-pool resources – a sub-set of common property. 
4   Carmichael and Cummins (no date).  
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issued also varies from State to State and even region to region. 
Definitions of reliability and rules pertaining to transferability are 
also inconsistent with one another.  There is also an array of 
restrictions on trading both within and among States.
5 
2 Background 
In 1994, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) collectively 
committed the governments of Australia to a water reform process.  
Two key elements of the COAG reform process are: first, a 
commitment to separate interests in land from interests in water; 
and second, to improve pricing arrangements (see Figure 1).  We 
leave water-pricing considerations, including the effects of 
inconsistent pricing arrangements on trade, to other reports. 
Nevertheless, it needs to be recognised that inconsistent pricing 
arrangements, inconsistent use conditions and inconsistent 
approaches to enforcement distort trade and discourage 
economically efficient resource use.
6 
Separation of interests in land from interests in water has 
facilitated the emergence of new markets for water resources.  In 
many areas, resources are now “capped” and pursuing new 
opportunities depends on trade.  However, significant impediments 
to trade have also been revealed.  National Competition Council 
assessments and an emerging body of research has identified 
significant economic gains in those areas where trading has 
occurred.
7  On the other hand, there have also been undesirable 
environmental impacts resulting from trading in water.  A major 
national debate has been generated about water allocation, river 
flows, water trading, the environment and compensation. 
Left for others to work out was the question of how best to specify 
interests and the associated obligations.  This report takes up that 
challenge and addresses critical concepts and principles associated 
with an economically efficient and equitable definition and trading 
of rights and obligations to use water. 
Rather than seeking to resolve these current issues within the 
existing framework, we search for the building blocks of a world 
leading system that could be put in place and allows current and 
possible future issues to be progressively resolved.  We encourage 
                                             
5   Hassall and Associates in Association with Musgrave (2002). 
6   See, for example, Brennan & Scoccimaro (1999); Eigenraam and 
Stoneham 91998); NCC(2002); Young et al. (2000) and Young & Hatton 
MacDonald (2001). 
7   See Bjornlund  (1999) and, also, Bjornlund and McKay (2000).  
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Figure 1  The COAG vision – legally separate interests in water from 
interests in land, specify them fully and price them 
appropriately. 
3  Vision 
The vision we hold is a belief that there exists a way to define 
interests in natural resources that will stand the test of time and, 
eventually, make the specification of interests in water non-
controversial. 
This paper searches for a generic approach to the definition of 
interests, rights, and obligations and use conditions and which sits 
comfortably within an economically efficient trading system.  Such 
systems emerge only when their conceptual building blocks are 
robust. To be adopted widely and to stand the test of time they 
need to be robust both from current perspectives and also those 
likely to emerge in the future.  The concept of robustness is similar 
to the National Competition Council proposition that the Australian 
water reform process should produce outcomes that are 
“durable.”
8 
                                             
8   See Shadwick (2002)  
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4  Critical Concepts and Principles 
4.1 Conceptual  Foundations 
From a “rights” perspective, the critical concept that COAG 
introduced was that of separation.  As a general rule, separation 
enables resources to be used in a more economically efficient 
manner but the devil is in the detail.  Separation of “water 
property rights from land title” was a first step.  The focus of this 
paper is on the second step – separation into a form that proves to 
be robust and non-controversial in the years to come. 
The question that COAG left unresolved was the issue of how to 
define “water property rights” once they have been separated 
from land titles (See Box 1).  Property rights are often described as 
a bundle of sticks with each stick representing a separate 
attribute. In a mature resource-limited environment, such as that 
characterised by a “capped” water resource, the way these 
attributes are assembled changes the way problems can be 
managed, the level of transaction costs and the understanding of 
risk.  
Current debates suggest that a robust system, among other things, 
would need to facilitate: 
The permanent resolution of allocation issues; 
The periodic distribution of allocations in a way that enables them 
to be used and traded at minimal cost; 
The definition of risks in a way that makes it clear where 
responsibility lies, under what circumstances compensation is due, 
and the processes for obtaining it; 
The management of externalities associated with use and 
consumption – the interests of third parties and future generations 
– with a minimum of controversy; 
Economically efficient and low cost trading and administration.  
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Box 1 
The 1994 COAG decision 
 “In relation to water allocations or entitlements;- 
 “(a) the State Government members or the Council, would 
implement comprehensive systems of water allocations or 
entitlements backed by the separation of water property rights 
from land title and clear specification of entitlements in terms of 
ownership, volume, reliability, transferability and, if applicable, 
quality,” 
 
Source: COAG Communiqué, 1994. 
For a robust system, we need a generic framework that will serve 
the test of time. Like a building that is designed to last for 
centuries, the conceptual foundations – the building blocks must be 
well organised. As noted earlier, most of the current systems have 
had trading, environmental management and other systems 
bolted – on.  None were designed from first principles to operate in 
an environment where systems had been developed to their 
biophysical limit and improvement could come only via adjustment 
and/or trade. 
Theory would suggest that a robust system must pass the 
conventional tests of efficiency and fairness in a changing 
environment.  Such a system will need to have solid conceptual 
foundations.  In the search for insights as to how to do this, we 
have cast our net wide. 
4.2  Searching for the building blocks 
Fundamental clues leading to the identification of building blocks 
for the foundation we put forward come primarily from the limited 
liability company and share trading system, from the Torrens Title 
system, and from the banking system. 
4.2.1   Limited Liability Share Companies 
The full extent and nature of risks associated with dealing with 
these legal entities and the way that collective interests are to be 
partitioned is well established and understood.  Decision-making 
protocols are also defined.  Opportunities are defined in terms of a 
share of net profits (periodic allocation - dividends). 
The limited liability share company system tells us that: 
One should trade only the “net” opportunity and never use the 
interest system to trade gross opportunities.  
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In an environment where future allocations are uncertain, interests 
should be expressed in proportional and not absolute terms. That 
is, interests should be defined so that arguments about fairness 
among those who hold a direct interest are resolved for once and 
for all time. 
Transaction costs are significantly lower if periodic allocations 
(dividends) are managed totally separately from trading in shares.  
Shares define interests in the receipt of future allocations, not 
allocations made in the recent past. 
Share company-like protocols offer an economically efficient and 
equitable way to respecify and/or separate collective interests via 
well-understood merger, acquisition and sub-division processes.  
Essentially, the mathematical rule is that one’s proportional 
interest, after adjusting for risk, should not change. 
4.2.2  The Torrens-Title system 
The Torrens-Title system revolutionised the means by which 
ownership was defined by drawing upon a ship-registration system 
developed in Germany.  Instead of producing a deed or contract to 
define ownership, one has to go to a register.  Essentially, the 
vision underpinning the Torrens Title system is that interests in 
property should be defined on a register not by distributed pieces 
of paper.  This simple insight dramatically reduces the opportunity 
for fraud and misrepresentation of the true nature of an interest.  
You can get a certified copy of what is recorded on the register but 
in any dispute, by law, the register is deemed to be correct.
9  
Under such a system, the residual risk of misrepresentation of an 
interest is so low that governments are prepared to guarantee its 
integrity. 
The Torrens-Title system tells us that: 
•  Full specification of interests is best achieved via 
guaranteed registration of all interests, including those of 
mortgagees, on a register rather than licences. 
•  For any transaction, formal settlement procedures are 
necessary to maintain system credibility. 
•  Transactions, once made, should be irreversible. No 
transaction should be completed until all third party 
interests have been cleared and arrangements put in place 
for all new interests to be registered fully as the 
transaction is executed. 
                                             
9   The copy of the signed original act is at 
http://www.foundingdocs.gov.au/places/sa/sa8.htm.  
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•  Permission to use an area of land for a specific purpose is 
most economically efficiently defined via processes that 
largely are independent of the definition of interests in that 
opportunity.  That is permission is granted to the people 
whose interests are recorded on the title, their heirs and 
their successors. 
4.2.3  The Banking System and Monetary System 
Over centuries the banking sector and governments have developed 
a remarkably uniform system for recording interests in quantities 
of money and the trading of them.  Essentially, there is a single 
generic system. 
In contrast to share and land title systems, pieces of money are 
never owned. One’s name is never attached to a coin or a note.  
Instead, a pool of money is managed by setting up accounts that 
define a person’s interest in the pool. Interest is defined without 
having to label each bit.  The result is a system with very low 
transaction costs. 
Formal exchange rates and mechanisms are used to convert from 
one currency to another.  A debit and credit system is used to 
record interests in the pool as they change by the second. 
The banking and global financial system tells us that: 
•  Internet accessible debit and credit accounting systems 
offer the state of the art in managing individual accounts. 
•  For transactions of relatively low value, costs can be 
lowered by not bothering to facilitate tracking of all the 
previous owners of a bundle of money. 
•  While a single system has its advantages, if the essential 
elements of the system are similar, then relatively simple 
and low cost exchange systems can be developed. 
•  Exchange rates can and need to adjust as information 
changes. 
•  Double entry recording of transactions reduces the 
likelihood of errors. 
4.2.4 The  Literature 
Generic literature on the design of tradeable property right 
systems is limited.  There are, however, a number of additional 
principles and concepts that are critical.  One of these, the  
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Tinbergen Principle
10 states that to attain a given number of 
independent targets there must be at least an equal number of 
instruments. This principle, and the research underpinning it, gives 
us insight into the importance of separation and the most 
appropriate way to do it.  In particular, issues associated with 
equity among aspiring users need to be managed separately from 
issues associated with management of the pool at any point in time 
and issues associated with use.  Interestingly, the emergence of 
the Tinbergen Principle as a concept central to the development of 
economics, led the Nobel Prize Committee to award the first Nobel 
Prize in economics to Jan Tinbergen and Ragnar Frisch in 1969. 
Both were recognised for their contributions to the development of 
dynamic modelling. 
5 Building  the  Foundation 
5.1 Separation 
As indicated earlier, COAG has recommended that interests in 
water be separated from interests in land.  Across Australia, 
transaction costs – both in political and administrative terms – are 
still high. Risks to water users, community, government and the 
environment tend to be high, especially when these risks are 
incompletely specified. 
Current practice has tended to combine well-defined components 
with poorly defined components.  This has frustrated progress.  
Every time a problem emerges the entire system is reviewed rather 
than simply that component where the problem arises. 
We believe the answer lies in further separation of interests in 
natural resources (property right) into its component parts. 
Separation of the interest into its component parts facilitates 
development of more economically efficient management and 
accounting systems.  It facilitates adjustment of part of the system 
without having to review the whole system.  This reduces 
transaction costs.  Moreover, risk management is more efficient 
when each type of risk is managed separately. 
                                             
10  The Tinbergen Principle is concerned with the possibility that there 
might be a robust way to efficiently manage conflicting issues in a 
dynamic environment.  Tinbergen identified the necessary conditions for 
a robust solution.  It is necessary to carefully examine the proposed set of 
instruments to determine whether or not the combination of instruments 
chosen will produce a solution that will stand the test of time (see 
Tinbergen 1950).  
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5.1  The critical components 
Typically, a single licence is allocated to a water user and managed 
via a host of complex procedures.  Even within a catchment, it is 
not uncommon to find many different types of licence alongside 
each other. However defined, each licence appears to contain 
three generic components: 
•  A long-term interest in a stream of periodic allocations; 
•  The stream of periodic allocations, which following 
assessment of resource availability, have been distributed 
or made available for use and/or trade; 
•  Permission to “use” the resource at a specific location 
subject to use conditions and obligations typically 
associated with the management of externalities.
11 
In the following sections, we provide more information on each of 
these components.  As a general rule and building on the clues 
summarised earlier (see section 3.2): 
•  The interest in the stream of periodic allocations is best 
defined as a proportional share of the “net” opportunity in 
the same manner that companies define equity ownership; 
•  Periodic distributions of allocations are similar to a stream 
of dividends and are best managed using transparent double 
accounting systems like those used by banks; and 
•  Obligations and conditions pertaining to use are best 
managed in a system that resembles the current licence 
system but written more like development approvals. 
                                             
11   Sometimes conditions pertaining to use and obligations to 
third parties are best separated.  
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5.2  Definitions of the interest 
As with a company and in a trading environment, shares and 
dividends can be managed at least cost if they are defined 
separately.   
For each dimension of a tradeable resource allocation system that 
needs to be managed, we propose a Separated System.  
Essentially, an interest in any common pool resource, like a 
quantity of water, can be considered as having three key 
components: 
•  The entitlement – the long-term interest (share) in a 
varying stream of periodic allocations; 
•  Allocations – a unit of opportunity (usually a volume) as 
distributed periodically; and 
•  The use licence – permission to use allocations with pre-
specified use conditions and obligations to third parties. 
In a separated system, each component can be managed 
independently without consideration of what is happening to the 
other component.  Entitlements define equity among those with 
interests in the resource, allocations define the periodic quantity 
that may be extracted from the common pool or sold, and the use 
licence defines the site-specific conditions pertaining to use 
including limits on the degree to which users, through their actions 
are allowed to change the environment. 
In areas or systems where use may cause adverse impacts like 
salinity, the use licence should be expressed in a manner that 
enables a separate entitlement/allocation system to be set up to 
manage that issue.  Similarly, the entitlement should be drafted in 
a manner that enables channel congestion to be devolved to a 
separate entitlement/allocation system. 
The system we summarise applies, with minor variation, to all 
water resource systems – regulated and unregulated, surface and 
ground.  Although not explained in this report, we suspect that it is 
applicable to many other common pool resources. 
Collectively, these three elements of the component determine 
the value of each unit and opportunities for trade in the interest.    
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5.2.1  Defining the entitlement 
The most valuable component is the entitlement – the interest in a 
stream of allocations that occur from time to time.  
Entitlements are granted by government.  They define the degree 
of access that can be expected over time and the nature of 
changes, if any, that can be expected. 
In defining the entitlement, five considerations are important: 
•  What priority, if any, is given to entitlement holders when 
the available resource is distributed and how reliable or 
variable access is likely to be; 
•  The nature of the periodic allocations to be expected; 
•  The extent of the area and resource over which risks 
associated with the entitlement are pooled; and 
•  How allocative risks are distributed between entitlement 
holders and the government; and 
•  The effects of land use changes on future allocations. 
Essentially, if both priority and risk are managed at the 
entitlement level, then trading of allocations can be relatively 
unconstrained and exposed to market forces.  Provided, of course, 
that externalities resulting from the use of the resource are 
managed via a separate use licence. 
Attention needs to be given to the size of the common pool.  
Within the pool there is little opportunity for arbitrage.  
Entitlement conversion from one part of the system to another 
requires an exchange rate to be set.  At every exchange point 
opportunity for arbitrage is created.
12  In fact, if this observation is 
taken to its logical conclusion then  
5.2.2  Priority among entitlement holders 
In the system proposed, the framework offered is similar to that 
used by companies to manage shares.  In a trading environment 
administrative costs tend to be lower if shares and dividends are 
managed separately.  Whenever a decision is made to make a 
distribution, a dividend is paid to current shareholders on a pro-
rata basis.  Thereafter, no attempt is made to trace where the 
dividend goes or where it is used.  That is a separate exercise.  The 
                                             
12  If this observation is taken to its logical conclusion then there is a case 
for at least considering issuing Basin-wide entitlements and asking holders 
to specify which reach they would like their allocation issued for.  
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share structure is used to define equity in distribution – not to 
manage the resource base. 
Management of priority is determined in companies through the 
issuance of classes of shares.  For most pool resources, 
distributions can be expected to vary through time and resource 
users can expect to have differing needs for access to the 
allocations.  As a general rule, some people will seek and value 
priority in allocation more than others.   Classically, in irrigation it 
is those with permanent plantings that seek greater priority in 
allocation so that they can reduce the risk that they will not 
receive an allocation from the pool. 
Many Australian systems separate interests by defining one group 
as having much higher priority than another.  High security and 
general security is the term used in New South Wales.  In some 
parts of the USA, volumes are allocated a priority according to 
date of issue.  The first issued volume always get their full 
allocation, the last rarely get water. 
Theoretically, if trading costs are very low, then there is little 
economic advantage in having more than one class of interest.  In a 
low trading cost environment, firms can tailor reliability by holding 
as much of an interest as they wish and selling surplus allocations 
as and when appropriate.  If trading costs are high, then there is a 
strong case for defining the interest by reliability class so that 
firms can tailor allocations to needs without having to trade to 
achieve an economically efficient result.
13  As a general rule, the 
lower trading costs are the simpler the system can be.  In a very 
low cost trading system, the economic case for more than one class 
of share is minimal and market mechanisms can be used to manage 
water supply risk.  In systems where there is more than one class of 
share, it is likely that in some situations allocations to the second 
class of share are likely to be minimal. 
The main advantages of the share language are well-understood 
conventions, and transparency in communication.  The word share 
makes it clear that the allocation may change.  In particular, the 
system requires administrators to announce the size of the 
allocation per share to be distributed and from what date that 
allocation will be made available for use.  It is necessary, also, to 
announce when the period over which the allocation may be used 
and what will happen if it is not used.  Under some systems, a 
considerable proportion of an unused allocation can be carried 
forward.  In other systems, storage without substantial loss is 
impossible.  Careful consideration of the incentives associated with 
                                             
13   That is, the more a government sets up barriers to trade, the more classes 
of reliability and means to access water it needs to offer.  In a perfect market 
where transaction costs are trivial, efficient resource use can be achieved 
with the unit interest defined in a single manner.  
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the carry forward versus partial or total extinguishment issue is 
necessary. 
We leave consideration to the most appropriate spatial unit over 
which interests are defined as an issue to be addressed in 
implementation.  These considerations do, however, increase the 
case for using a share like structure. 
5.2.3  Definition of the unit of allocation 
In corporate systems, shares define an interest in the net result of 
company performance.  The parallel approach for natural 
resources, like water, is that the share should be in the quantity of 
water consumed. Interestingly, most water interests in the United 
States of America are defined in these terms.  The literature and 
experience there suggests that only the volume that is consumed 
should be tradeable and that, as a result of improvements in 
water-use efficiency, irrigators should be allowed only to retain 
real increases in the volume of water consumed.
14   
Critically and as summarised in Box 2, if this principle of only 
allowing people to trade the volume to water that is consumed is 
violated then improvements in water use efficiency will cause any 
fully allocated system to become over-allocated and any over-
allocated system to become even more over-allocated.  Under the 
scenario set out in Box 2,100,000 ML of permanent water trades 
results in 40,000 ML increase in the total volume of water that is 
consumed.  In the past, Australian irrigators have been allowed to 
keep and use these savings and, as a result, the quantity of water 
used in capped systems continues to increase. 
For systems where technical water use efficiency is not high,
15 
essentially, there are two robust approaches to this “return flow” 
problem.   
1.  Either, any interest in a stream of periodic allocations 
should be defined as a “net” interest reflecting the quantity 
consumed not the volume pumped.  Returns via surface 
drainage and through groundwater need to be accounted 
                                             
14  See Hartman and Seastone (1965) for a thorough discussion of the 
importance of ensuring that trade does not result in the transfer of return 
flows that are already being used by some-one else. For Australian 
information on the scale of this issue see MacDonald & Heaney (2002) and 
Heaney and Beare (2002). 
15  Drip irrigation systems tend to be relatively efficient but most other 
types of irrigation return significant proportions of water to the river via 
drainage and groundwater processes.  That which returns via groundwater 
can involve considerable time lags.  Local soil conditions, the nature of 
aquifer arrangements and distance to the river also influence the extent 
of the time lags involved.  
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for.  Where this is not possible, the proportion of an 
allocation that is “deemed” to be used should be 
documented.  
2.  Or, as water use efficiency increases there is an across the 
board reduction in the quantity of water per unit 
entitlement periodically allocated. 
As indicated earlier, for a robust solution to the allocation 
problem, it is necessary also to manage salinity and other water 
quality issues separately from the management of volume.  That is, 
if for example, a return flow causes an increase in river salinity or 
dryland salinity, that issue needs to be managed using a separate 
policy instrument.  Later in this report, it is recommended that use 
licences be used to manage impacts like these on third parties and, 
when and or where the problem becomes significant, the problem 
be managed using a separate entitlement/allocation structure.   
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Box 2   
The consequences of defining an interest in gross rather than 
net terms 
Consider 50 farms that each have an allocation of 2,000 ML.  The 
total allocation is 100,000 ML. 
Assume also that these farms are irrigating at 50% Water Use 
Efficiency.  That is, they pump 2,000 ML but 1,000 ML of this 
returns to the River via surface drainage and groundwater 
recharge.   As a result, these 50 farms use only 50,000 ML. 
Suppose that each of these farms decide to sell all their interest to 
people who plan to use if to grow grapes under drip irrigation using 
technology that achieves 90% water use efficiency.  As a result, 
consumptive use changes from 50,000 ML to 90,000 ML. 
After the system returns to equilibrium, as a result of the trade all 
irrigators in the system lose access to 40,000 ML that would 
previously have been shared among them.  Gradually, a system 




5.2.4  Full specification of risk 
COAG and others have repeatedly emphasised the need for the full 
specification.  One of the main issues is the risk that expected 
distribution of future allocations may change.   If fully specified, 
then the risk of change in entitlements and allocations needs to be 
partitioned between the interest holders and the government.  The 
mechanisms used to partition this risk should resemble a two-sided 
contract where the government is required legally to pay 
compensation for those matters for which it accepts 
responsibility.
17  
Typically company share systems make it clear that the risk of 
changes in value resulting from “natural” variation, underlying 
                                             
16   MacDonald & Heaney (2002) estimated that if water use efficiency in the 
Murrumbidgee system is increased by 10% and all the savings are retained by 
irrigators then the mean flow rate at Morgan in South Australia declines by 
0.5%.  However, if all the savings are returned to the River, the mean flow 
rate at Morgan increases by 2%. 
17   The dearth of legal precedent in the area of water law in Australia 
suggests that very few water licences are fully specified.  Essentially, most 
are one-sided contracts.  Licensee obligations are fully specified but those of 
the government incompletely specified.  
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changes in technology etc. are risks that the holder of the share 
bears fully.  Action can, however, be taken whenever a 
proportional interest is suddenly and significantly eroded and/or an 
administrative error is made. As a general guideline, we conclude 
that the use of share terminology communicates a much better 
sense of the unit of entitlement and what is compensable than a 
volumetric specification.
18 
Arbitrary decisions purely taken as a result of political pressure and 
imposed on the system may alter the balance between 
consumptive use and the environment, and/or between different 
consumptive users.  On the other hand, over time, political and 
adaptive administrative processes may properly reflect changes in 
community values. 
While it is not possible to fully specify the exact quantity of water 
that will be available in a varying environment, it is possible to 
fully specify risk.  The essential proposition is that in an 
environment where climates change, technology improves and 
knowledge of the system is likely to improve, greater equity and 
investment security may be achieved through a focus on the 
specification of risk rather than a formal share to the environment.   
A suggested framework for the assignment of risk is presented as 
Table 1.  In essence, we suggest that compensation would be 
payable only when risk turns to reality and only in circumstances 
that might, in retrospect, be reasonably described as failure by the 
administrative agency to exercise adequate duty of care or 
diligence in managing the interests of all parties. It seems 
reasonable to expect a government to be able to manage and plan 
the transition from development of a resource to sustained use.  In 
particular, it seems reasonable to signal the extent of the change 
and not drift into situations that result, for example, in gross over-
allocation or a need for a sudden precipitous change.  
One example of the risks associated with allocating quotas in 
anything other than a proportional basis can be found in New 
Zealand fisheries.  In the 1980s, fishing licences were defined as 
absolute tonnage quotas and some new ones sold by Treasury.  
Subsequently, it became clear that some over allocation existed 
and that some quotas would have to be cut.  As a result, the 
Government decided to convert all fisheries from absolute tonnage 
quotas to proportional share quotas and, by way of compensation, 
reduce the resource rent for a number of years in significantly 
                                             
18  One way of progressing conversion from a volumetric system to a share 
entitlement system would be for agencies to begin by simultaneously 
labelling licences in both terms.  A 3,000 ML high security licence, for 
example, might also be defined as representing 300,000 shares in the 
quantity of water periodically defined as being available for distribution 
to those people who hold high security shares. Related implementation 
issues are the questions of the spatial extent of the rights that are shared 
and the number of classes of share issued.  
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affected fisheries.  In Australia, compensation may not be payable 
for reduction of a water allocation.  When considering the issue of 
whether or not compensation was payable when a fishing 
entitlements where reduced by the Australian Fisheries 
Management Authority, it was found that even though fishing units 
where found to be a form of property, a proportional reduction of 
in these units in the fishery was not considered to be an 
“acquisition” under the meaning of Section 51 (xxxi) of the 
Australian Constitution.
19  
Risk is related to the political and institutional environment in 
which the property right system operates.  
For some issues, the risks are associated with administrative 
process.  For others, the risks are associated with changes in 
community values and investments.  The essential question is one 
of how risk specification effects resource management decisions.   
As a general guideline, risks associated with changes in the natural 
functioning of an ecosystem are most effectively managed if made 
a full cost to business (adaptive management).  Similarly, if 
government bears the full costs of arbitrary decisions and is 
required to compensate for them, they will have a strong incentive 
to avoid making them. 
Administrative decisions taken by the organization/s responsible 
for managing the system ideally would flow from improved 
knowledge and understanding of the system, and after due 
process. 
These may include: 
•  varying periodic allocations to take into account seasonal 
variation; 
•  changing the relative shares between consumptive users 
and the environment (generally will be a reduction in 
consumptive use)as a result of improved knowledge about 
the capacity of the resource and after due process; and 
•  changing the trading rules for water including modifying 
exchange rates to minimize arbitrage, or changing the way 
in which market-based instruments (MBIs) are used. 
                                             
19  Federal Court of Australia.  Minister of Primary Industry and Energy 
and Australian Fisheries Management Authority v’s Davey et al.,  1993.  
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Table 1    Assignment of Risk 
Financial risk of change met entirely by 
entitlement  holder 
(Adaptive Risk) 
Compensation claim may be 
made against administering 
agency  
(Duty of care in managing the 
interests of all parties ) 
Financial risk 
incompletely specified 
or shared  
(Uncertainty) 
Natural variations in periodic allocations  (eg. 
seasonal fluctuations) 
Change in mean annual rainfall (eg. effect of climate 
change) 
Revised estimate of the capacity of the resource that 
are the result of an adaptive process (eg. improved 
scientific knowledge – adaptive management, proper 
process, relatively small changes over time) 
Land-use change
a) 
 (eg. pastures replaced by forestry) 
 
Administrative error associated 
with a transaction. An 
adjustment judged by the 
courts to be capricious. 
Issuance of new entitlements 
once the system is known to be 
fully allocated. 
Rapid and unexpected 
administrative change resulting 
in a sudden and significant 
reduction in the value of share 
entitlements
b).    
 
Catastrophes such as the 
failure of a dam. 
 
a) For significant land-use changes, it is possible to require that any negative impacts of land-use change be offset via 
the purchase and surrender of an entitlement equivalent to the size of the expected impact.  Similarly, it is possible 
to allow issuance of entitlement shares when land-use change results in a positive contribution. 
b) For example, resulting from initial over-commitment and failure to allocate in a precautionary manner. 
5.3  Registration of the interest 
The Natural Resource Management Council (2002) has 
recommended that “Registers of water entitlements like those for 
land and shares should be open and inspectable.”   
Before interests in water were separated from interests in land, 
interests in water could only be mortgaged by registering a 
mortgage on a land title.  At this time, virtually all land titles in 
Australia were registered under a Torrens-Title like system,  
sometimes called a “new” system title.  From the perspective of 
some lending institutions, separation of interests in water from 
interests in land has resulted in the transfer of their registered 
interest from a “new” system to an “old” system.
20  The main 
feature of the Torrens system is that all interests are defined by 
reference to a register rather than a paper trail of contracts, etc.  
Certificates of titles rather than actual titles are issued.  As a 
                                             
20   See Natural Resource Management Council (2002) prepared by Marsden 
Jacob Associates.  The statement is not strictly correct as the licences could 
always be cancelled.  
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result, a very high degree of protection is achieved.  So high, in 
fact, that governments can set up procedures enabling the register 
and all details on it to be guaranteed.  This dramatically lowers the 
cost of borrowing money and significantly simplifies administrative 
procedures associated with a transaction. 
As a general rule, the asset value of a unit interest in a stream of 
periodic allocations is much more valuable than an interest in a 
specific allocation volume.  As a result, different registration 
arrangements are appropriate.  Torrens Title experience highlights 
the merits of defining interests in a guaranteed register rather 
than by issuing licences and several states are in the process of 
doing this.  If this is not done, there is considerable risk of fraud.  
Under the Torrens Title system, a certificate of title is issued as an 
authorised copy of that recorded on the register.  Applied to water 
entitlements, all entitlements and any change to one or more of 
these could be transacted only by changing the details recorded on 
the register. 
5.3.1  Mortgages and interests of other third parties 
A register rather than a conventional licence approach also makes 
it possible for banks and other financiers to register a financial 
interest in an entitlement and prevent sale until that interest is 
cleared.  Effectively, it would be possible to register a mortgage 
over an entitlement.  A mortgage has two characteristics.  First, in 
the case of default on a loan and following due process, it gives 
the mortgagee a preferential right to sell the asset and use the 
proceeds to recover moneys owing.  This dramatically reduces the 
risk of lending money and, hence, the interest rate at which money 
is loaned. Moreover, by separating entitlements from use licences 
and allocations, issues associated with default can be managed 
separately from those associated with use. 
Under such a system, it would be possible for a water supply 
company to register an interest in a volume of water or a water 
share holding that would provide protection from becoming 
exposed financially to the “stranded” assets problem.  This 
problem is thought to be likely to arise when the holders of an 
irrigation licence sell their entitlements or allocations to others 
and, hence, are no longer willing to pay for the cost of maintaining 
irrigation infrastructure.  Mortgageability would make it possible 
for a water supply company to recover the cost of its investment if 
the supply structure is not used. 
5.3.2 Trading 
The question then arises of how changes should be made to the 
register and trades executed.  Global experience with the Torrens 
Title System and transactions involving significant amounts of 
money suggest that brokers should be licensed and that formal 
settlement procedures are necessary.  
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In summary and as a general guideline, unit interests in the 
periodic distribution of allocations (entitlements) should be 
recorded on a register that is guaranteed and facilitates the 
registration of third party interests.  Formal settlement procedures 
should be used to execute changes to the register. 
5.4  Periodically distributed allocations 
An interest in a periodically distributed allocation derives from a 
share or its equivalent.  However, the nature of the asset and its 
value is quite different from the share.  In particular, and if 
priority is managed via the entitlement, there is no need to 
duplicate management of allocation priority at the distribution 
stage.
21  A distributed allocation is a right to either trade the 
resource or be subject to compliance with use conditions and 
obligations. 
Once “used” or at the end of the period, the allocation is 
extinguished.  For most water resources, the allocation is 
progressively extinguished as it is pumped.  For most fishing 
resources under quota management, the allocation is progressively 
extinguished as catch is landed. 
Reflecting the history of the development of licensing and 
allocation systems, the practices commonly used to manage assets 
of this form are rarely used.  Typically, the entitlement is to trade 
or use part of a common pool resource.  In the case of water, it 
may be an entitlement to pump a specific volume and/or sell that 
opportunity to someone else.  In the case of fish, it is an 
entitlement (quota) to harvest and sell a weight of fish. 
As illustrated in Figure 2 and Figure 3, the state of the art for 
accounting for the status of such systems has been developed by 
the banking sector.  These systems define ownership via a set of 
accounts that debit and credit trades and record draw down of the 
pool. No attempt is made to define ownership of each coin or note 
in the system.  Subject to well-known conditions, account holders 
are guaranteed the opportunity to withdraw from the common pool 
as and when they like.  A water account could be made accessible 
over the internet with trades possible either by writing a cheque or 
by electronic transfer. 
                                             
21   If there is a need to assign priority in the delivery system then we consider 
it more efficient to allocate and distribute channel capacity separately.  
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Figure 2   Hypothetical Water Account  
 
Account Name: Aussie Irrigation 
Statement No: 24  
Date   Debit  Credit  Balance 
1/7/01  Balance bought forward      400 
1/9/01 Periodic  allocation 
1000 shares translates to 2000 ML 
of water that may be consumed 
 2000 2400 
12/10/01  Transfer from XYZ Pty Ltd 
Cheque No. 1234 5678 
 500  2900 
3/11/01  Use from 1/9/01 to 1/11/01 
(Pumped 1000 ML and deemed to 
have used 50%) 
500   2400 
3/11/01  Transfer from AB&CD Smith 
Electronic RN 9876543  
 300  2700 
30/4/02  Use from 2/11/01 to 30/4/02 
(Pumped 1320 ML and deemed to 
have used 50%) 
660   2040 
30/5/02  Unused water not available for 
carry forward to 2002/03 season 




      
Pay ____________________________________________
The sum of  ________________________________ ML of 2002/03 Water
Water Trading Australia
Signature______________________
807512  085 249:0223  7851
Date ____________
________ML Pay ____________________________________________
The sum of  ________________________________ ML of 2002/03 Water
Water Trading Australia
Signature______________________




Figure 3   A water cheque that could be used to trade water  
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5.4.1  Use obligations of periodic allocations 
Importantly, in the system advocated above, the issuance of a 
share (entitlement) and even the holding of a distributed allocation 
would provide no permission to use a resource.  Either of the first 
two components would, however, be fully tradeable.  
5.5  The Use Licence 
To use an allocated resource, a third component is required.  This 
we have earlier labelled the use licence.  Typically, a use licence 
would set out the conditions of use and the nature of obligations to 
third parties. 
Conditions of Use 
These conditions arise with specific use of the periodic allocation 
and should reflect requirements provided for in a statutory water 
management plan.  They should be attached to a use licence and 
may include pumping and drainage disposal requirements, possibly 
restrictions on practice, and reporting requirements. Details are 
likely to be subject to periodic change and review as new 
technology and relative costs change.  Often they are likely to be 
quite site specific and relate to more generic arrangement set out 
in a management plan for the area in question. 
The licence, however, would set out the degree of use permitted 
in much the same way as an approval is given to construct a house.  
For example, a use licence may grant permission to flood irrigate a 
maximum of 350 hectares on a specified area of land.  Under such 
an arrangement it would be possible for a person to decide to 
operate as an irrigator without holding any entitlement and, 
simply, buy water as and when it is needed. 
Third-Party Obligations 
Third-party impacts arise from resource use not the action of 
holding an entitlement or allocation.  The bottom-line statement 
of obligations should indicate the maximum degree of impact on 
others that is allowable.  For example, it may reserve the right to 
pollute to the State and indicate that the user may be obliged to 
rectify damages imposed on others and or the environment.   
Management planning processes could be used to signal when and 
to what extent obligations may be allowed to accumulate.  To this 
end, management plans need to be statutory instruments that have 
standing in law.  They would also be consistent with any district or 
regional salinity management strategy, and may possibly be met 
wholly or partly through the use of market based instruments (eg.  
salinity credits).  
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Progressive advancement of standards associated with the 
maximum degree of impact on others should be anticipated.  Two 
approaches are possible either a fixed and automatic trigger can be 
placed in a licence or, alternatively, the licence may authorise 
actions that impose costs on others until a management plan 




A related issue is the need for legislation to implement a separated 
right system.  Legislation facilitates and encourages consistency in 
approach.  In some states, existing arrangements and reforms 
underway mean that few amendments would be necessary to move 
to the proposed system.  In other States significant changes are 
necessary.   
6  Comparison of system with fundamental 
characteristics 
Any discussion of existing or proposed property rights generally 
involves the specification of a set of essential characteristics 
defining the property right against which the existing or proposed 
property rights is tested. 
Scott (1999) provided the following list of fundamental 
characteristics in relation to individual transferable quotas in 
rights-based fisheries management that has been adapted and used 
in papers about water rights by the Productivity Commission, 
Sheenan, and the National Farmers Federation.
23  Scott’s original 
list of fundamental characteristics can be summarised as follows: 
Duration – the period for which the interest is defined 
Flexibility – the extent to which the interest can be 
modified or altered without consent. 
Exclusivity – the degree to which the interest holder 
receives all the benefits from exercision of the allocated 
opportunity 
Quality of title – the extent of “security,” protection from 
fraud, opportunity to use as collateral, etc 
                                             
22  In law, effectively this is the difference between a defeasible interest 
and a conditional interest. 
23  See Aretino, et al. (2001), Sheenan (2002), NFF (2002), & Scott (1999).  
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Transferability – the extent of freedom to trade (level of 
constraints) 
Divisibility – whether or not the interest can be subdivided 
into parts and each part held separately. 
The Productivity Commission list is as follows: 
Universality – all resources are privately owned and all 
entitlements (rights over how they can be used) are 
completely specified. 
Exclusivity – all benefits and costs that result from owning 
and using the resource only accrue to the owner, either 
directly or indirectly by sale to others 
Transferability – all property rights are transferable from 
one owner to another in a voluntary exchange. 
Enforceability – property rights are secure from involuntary 
seizure and encroachment 
The Productivity Commission in reducing the list to four appears to 
have included quality of title, duration, and divisibility in 
universality.  Enforceability seems to encompass flexibility, but has 
other elements of protection against encroachment or seizure. 
The Separated System proposed addresses each of these 
characteristics as follows: 
Universality – The share entitlement is long-term, non-
extinguishable and would remain even if no allocations are 
made for a number of years.  Allocations, when made, are 
provided for a specified period and are extinguished at the 
end of that period.  The use licence includes conditions of 
use and obligations to third parties.  
Flexibility – The share entitlement provides for a pro-rata 
share of a variable resource.  Allocations are in proportion 
to the number of shares held. Use licence conditions can be 
varied via a management plan.  Permission to use water is 
similar in style to a development approval. Risks assigned 
and responsibility specified.   For those risks assigned to the 
government, compensation is payable and process for 
redress identified. 
Exclusivity – the holder has exclusive access to the benefits 
of the use of the resource either directly or indirectly by 
sale to others.  The Use licence does not guarantee the 
right to harm others.  The system is designed to allow the 
creation of shares and allocations for salinity emissions, 
channel capacity, etc.  
Quality of Title – Interests are defined on a register in a 
Torren’s Title-like manner.  Mortgages can be registered. It  
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is impossible to transfer the interest without first clearing 
all registered interests. Allocations are managed via a bank-
like accounting system.  Formal settlement procedures are 
used. Brokers are licensed. 
Transferability – both share entitlements and periodic 
allocations are fully tradeable.  Exchange rates are pre-
specified.  No trade can be “undone.” Internet based 
trading of allocations is possible.  Cheque-like transactions 
are possible. 
Divisibility – Periodic allocations can be sold in whole or in 
part down to the smallest unit of allocation in the register.  
A single share can be sold. 
7 Implementation  issues 
There are a number of important implementation issues that 
require addressing.  The most topical of these is the issue of how 
to define the environment’s interest so that its effect on the 
interests of consumptive users is fully understood and accepted.   
The environment’s interest can be defined as being either 
•  prior to those of consumptive users; or 
•  equivalent and, hence, defined so that trade between 
environment and consumptive use is possible.   
Under the prior model, all risk of change in the expected stream of 
allocations due to alteration in environmental values is born by 
entitlement holders.  Under the equivalent model, risk is shifted to 
society and change, if not executed via a market transaction, 
would be compensable.  In this latter case, for example, 1,000 
shares may be allocated to irrigators, urban and industrial water 
users and 500 shares to the environment.  The environmental 
managers would then need to decide if, when and how they would 
enter into the market for allocations and the market for 
entitlements. 
There are significant political, economic, social and environmental 
risks associated with the equivalent model that might, without 
careful analysis prove catastrophic.   Entitlement values will be 
higher under the equivalent model than under the prior model.  
Careful, examination of these two alternative models and variants 
of them is necessary.  If the environment’s interest is managed 
under the “equivalent” model, very careful consideration has to be 
given to the way periodic allocations would be managed and 
accounted for.   
Consideration also needs to be given to the vexatious issue of what 
charges should apply and the question of whether or not some of 
the increase in the value should be clawed back. Indeed, if the  
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equivalent model is chosen then, arguably, there is a strong case 
for collecting some economic rent to ensure that sufficient money 
is available to cover the cost of increasing an environmental 
allocation if this proves necessary.
24 
Conceptually, it is possible to make a base allocation to the 
environment under prior rules and then manage the residual under 
the equivalent model. Careful consideration needs to also be given 
to accountability issues and the most appropriate governance 
structures for the management of any environment allocation, 
especially if trade between environment and irrigation is 
contemplated.   
Other critical implementation issues to be explored include 
questions about  
Definition, Planning and Management and, in particular: 
•  Identifying the most appropriate spatial extent of each 
entitlement – a Basin, a catchment, a valley or a reach – 
with close consideration of the arbitrage and risk-sharing 
opportunities different arrangements set up; 
•  Determining the pros and cons of having a single 
entitlement versus one where there are two, three or more 
classes of shares;  
•  Determining how the separated system can be linked 
seamlessly to overland flows, farm dams and unregulated 
streams;  
•  Determining how to adjust existing over-allocation of water 
resources, and how to allocate water resources that are not 
fully subscribed; and 
•  Determining the most appropriate planning and 
management structure to ensure that use remains 
sustainable. 
                                             
24  The simplest and most economically way of doing this that we are 
aware of is to require each entitlement holder to surrender a proportion 
of their entitlement each year and then put this amount up for auction.  
Known as a “return-to-the-community,” if the aim is to charge a 1% on 
the gross value of the entitlement, then 1% needs to be surrendered and 
sold.  Similarly, if the aim is to collect 2% of the economic rent then 2% 
needs to be sold.  The main advantage for this method, which is used in 
some forestry and some fishing systems, is its simplicity and the fact that 
the industry is forced to self-assess value.  The mechanism also 
significantly deepens the market for the resource and makes values very 
transparent (Young 1999; Young and McCay 1995).  
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Trading and dealing and, in particular,  
•  Determining what charging and pricing arrangements should 
apply; 
•  Establishing a bank-like trading system for allocations; 
•  Determining how to manage simply the return flow or 
“gross” versus “net” issue; 
•  Determining the extent to which inter-dependent 
entitlements can be exchanged for one another – surface 
water for groundwater; 
•  Determining the periodic allocations and time until 
extinguishment; and 
•  Determining whether or not allocations should be managed 
at the same or a different scale to entitlements. 
Use licence specification and, in particular, 
•  Determining how to specify third-party obligations and 
organising them so that they can be separated from the use 
licence and, issues like salinity and channel flow capacity, 
managed in an independent trading environment. 
•  Determining what needs to be included in a use licence and 
what is best left in a management plan and how the two 
should interact; and 
•  Determining how use licence conditions can be reviewed 
and the best processes used to change them. 
Conversion 
•  Determining what principles and processes should be used 
to convert from each of the many systems that are 
currently in place to the proposed separated system; and 
•  Determining how to convert the licences in any specific 
area to the new separated system.  
8 Concluding  comment 
While some may disagree, we consider all the above, including the 
question of how to define and manage environmental flows as 
second order issues that need to be considered after a robust 
foundation is in place.  Consequently, we perceive that the next 
steps involve careful exploration and consideration of the 
separated system proposed in this report followed by a series of 
reports on each of the issues listed above:  Options for definition of 
the environment’s interest; integrated planning and management  
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of the resource; trading and registration arrangements; use licence 
specification; and conversion principles. 
Finally, as stated at the start of this report, we seek a robust way 
to define interests in water and other natural resources.  To this 
end, we seek comments and feedback.  Comments should be sent 
to Mike.Young@csiro.au or Jim.McColl@csiro.au.  We can be 
contacted by phone on 08-8303.8665.  
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